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M. Stuart  adde en? 
ABSTRACT: The Institutes of Justinian and other Graeco-Roman 
recitations of tort-type delicts and remedies are recognized as root stock of 
modern western tort law, common law, or civil code-based alike. Long 
before these sources, however, both ancient and primitive cultures adopted 
norms and customs which defined permissible individual and group 
conduct, and which provided for remedies ranging from money damages to 
banishment. Among the surveyed examples of ancient cultural responses to 
tort-type delicts were numerous instances in which both the civil wrong 
identified and the remedy provided for can be harmonized readily with 
modem tort law, whether it is practiced in common law or civil code 
nations or throughout the world. A broad range of such examples can be 
found not only in the nations or regions in which such norms obtained, but 
also in their specific subject areas: pubic nuisance, manslaughter, assault, 
trespass, conversion, negligence, strict liability, deceit, defamation, and 
even invasion of privacy. Indeed, a review of ancient tort-type law dispels 
any Euro-centric claim that westem Europeans led in the conception and 
nurturance of tort principles at any point in history. 
Countless years before the coalescence of human groupings into civil 
societies, kinship groups, and later tribes and cultures, people needed norms 
by which individual conduct could be ordered. The primary stimulus for 
such norms was group survival, and the ancillary motivations were the 
achievement of civil peace and the protection of one's person and property 
from wrongful harm. The means by which normative behavioral 
impositions operated took countless shapes, but the avenues taken could be 
classified, in roughly chronological order, as spiritualism, folk tales, folk 
law, mythology, religion, and customary law.' 
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Myriam Afif and Michael Stalzer for their research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. For the purposes of this article, the terms "ancient" and "primitive" are distinguished 
in this way: "ancient" is a designation that the example existed in recorded antiquity, and 
"primitive" connotes that the example can be identified or hypothesized as existing in preliterate 
society. 
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The application of such sources as justification for modem civil justice 
decision-making has largely disappeared, although perhaps not entirely. An 
electronic search within state and federal legislative databases for "I cannot 
tell a lie" or "Horatio Alger" would surely reveal a cluster of allusions, and 
the cyclical debate over religion in public affairs without more betrays the 
tenacity of religion's influence on our public life. Withal, even though the 
sources of contemporary civil law have changed, the needs of modem 
society for a similar order and predictability in human civil affair remain 
very similar to the needs confronting our ancestors. It is therefore 
unsurprising that ancient examples of normative beliefs, practices, and 
customary law reveal sprawling similarities with modem tort law. 
At the core of tort norms, and later tort law, has always been a group 
desire that disputes be resolved without retaliation and escalation. This 
rationale receives an early expression from the Greek observer 
Demosthenes, in the speech Against Konon, as it might pertain to remedies 
for battery and abuse: 
[In] cases of battery; these, I am told, exist in order that no one, 
when losing, should defend himself with a stone or anything of 
that sort, but he should await the legal case. . . . The most trivial 
offence, I suppose, that of abuse, has been provided for to [ensure] 
. . . that homicide should not be committed, . . . but [that] there 
should be a legal case for each of these, and they should not be 
decided by the individual's anger or whim.2 
Islamic law too is clear cut in its differentiation between excusable self- 
defense and culpable retaliati~n.~ 
At the same time, it would be disingenuous to deny that dissimilarities 
between ancient and modem approaches to civil justice are not likewise 
apparent at almost every turn to this inquiry. Some primitive remedies for 
conversion might offer not only restitution to the wronged party but also the 
opportunity to exact a fine, to be collected by the complainant himself, a 
double recovery by today's  standard^.^ Other pairings of right and remedy 
might at first seem suggestive of the modem action in public nuisance, but, 
upon closer evaluation, be seen to depart from that rule in the designation of 
who may bring the claim. And a very large number of disputes are resolved 
not by fact-finding, application of governing norms, and an adjudicatory 
2. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL THENS 123 (Cornell 1978) 
(quoting Demosthenes, Against Konon 54.17-19). 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 3 9 4 2 .  
4. See, e.g., Shih-Yii Yii Li, Tibetan Folk-Law, J .  ROY. ASIATIC SOC. G.B. & IRELAND 
PARTS 3, 4, pp. 127-48 (1950), reprinted in 1 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN & ALAN DUNDES, 
FOLK LAW 5 13-26 (1995). 
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declaration, but rather by mediation and conciliation, which although a goal 
in numerous modern state and federal precincts in the United States, cannot 
be described as a general rule. 
As suggested, over the ages the nature of offenses that have stimulated 
identification as redressable wrongs has become mostly settled. The 
designations of the subsections in Part I1 to this research largely comprise 
them: (I) public and private nuisance and disturbing the peace; (2) 
unintentional killing; (3) assault and battery; (4) trespass to land and 
chattels; ( 5 )  conversion; (6) negligence; (7) strict liability; (8) deceit and 
false report; (9) defamation and false witness; and, in some cultures, (10) 
covetousness and hoarding. 
Describing with confidence the range of remedies for such wrongs, much 
less their varied justifi~ations~is a more difficult task. Or at least it seems so 
due to the diverse ways tort objectives are described--often in terminology 
that seems not so much a dispassionate description than an argument for a 
polemical position. The more interesting groupings of tort objectives can be 
found in a source one would not at first think of: Friedrich Nietzsche. In his 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche identifies a core cluster of the objectives of 
punishment.5 Winnowed of punishments suited to criminal actions, one is 
left with more classically civil, or only quasi-criminal, responses, i.e., the 
types of remedies associated with torts. To Nietzsche, these include: 
2. Punishment consisting of the payment of damages to the injured 
party, including affect ~om~ensation.~ 3  Punishment as the 
isolation of a disequilibrating agent, in order to keep the 
disturbance from spreading f~rther.~. . . 8. Punishment as a means 
of creating memory, either for the one who suffers it-so-called 
"improvement"--or for the witnesses. 9. Punishment as the 
payment of a fee, exacted by the authority which protects the evil- 
doer from the excesses of vengeance. 10. Punishment as a 
compromise with the tradition of vendetta . . . . 8 
A question central to this article can be framed in this way: When it 
comes to tort law, can it be said that "It has always been thus?" The 
question may be answered with an acceptable degree of accuracy in the 
affirmative. As Henry Sumner Maine observed: 
5. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF ~ G E D Y  AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 2 13 
(Francis Golfing, trans., Anchor Books 1956). 
6 .  "Affect compensation" may be understood to mean damages for emotional distress. 
7. Particularly among indigenous peoples, a person refusing to follow community norms 
was perceived, as is true in some instances today, to destabilize the community. As will be seen 
in the discussion to follow, for lesser offenses, the response might be temporary shunning. For 
more serious or more sustained delicts, the individual might be banned from the group. 
8. NIETZSCHE, supra note 5, at 213. 
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Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of 
Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical 
word, of Torts. The person injured proceeds against the wrong- 
doer by an ordinary civil action, and recovers compensation in the 
shape of money-damages if he succeeds. . . . [All such Torts] gave 
rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and were all requited by a 
payment of money.g 
It is noteworthy that primitive and ancient law contain numerous 
examples in which the society has seemingly concluded that simple 
corrective justice is insufficient to reach the joint objectives of redressing 
the harm done and of deterring the actor and others from the same or similar 
conduct. For example, throughout the Rules of Punishment for Tibetans, 
published by the Manchu Imperial Court in 1733, the burden imposed by 
the restitutionary interest of the rule, i.e., the return of the animal, and 
elsewhere the property, etc., is seemingly ancillary to, the punishment 
dimension of the rule." It might be surmised that over time a culture's 
collective wisdom was that simple restorative justice had an insufficient 
gravitas as a deterrent if unaccompanied by a fine payable to the wronged 
party.11 In cases of incorrigibility, though, the penalty might be shunning or 
even banning from the community.12 
I have suggested that as a general proposition, spiritualism, folk tales, 
folk law, mythology, religion, and customary law underlay ancient law. The 
import of spiritualism and its more formal successor, religion, is self 
revealing. So too is mythology with its gods, demigods, pantheism, and 
anthropomorphism. 
Customary law, sometimes called the "living law," has reflected norms 
to which a particular society has assigned epochal and steadfast adherence; 
9. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 358 (Charles M. Haas ed., Beacon Press 1963) 
(1861) (emphasis in original). To Maine's account it is worthwhile to add that in addition to or 
as an alternative to money damages, and as will be described below, both primitive and ancient 
communities might require other remedies. Replacement of any goods or animals damaged or 
injured is one example. 
10. In this sense, the diverse fines provided for in Tibetan folk law operated as punishment 
bearing similarities to today's punitive damages. See, e.g., Rules 20-21, Rules of Punishment 
for Tibetans; Yii Li, supra note 4, at 525. 
11. Id. 
12. Few societies today maintain gulags to which persons may be banished, although with 
the passing of opportunities to send persons to entirely different continents such as Australia, 
prisons and jails serve similarly. Excommunication in the Catholic Church harkens to such 
themes. In the early church, excommunication carried with it the revocation of other ordinary 
rights in civil society. This deterrent cannot be seen to have worked tembly well, as in the year 
1337 it is estimated that half of Christendom was under sentence of excommunication. 1 ERNST 
TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 234 n.100a (Olive Wyon 
trans., Harper & Brothers 1960) (191 1). 
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rules that a culture has followed so unflaggingly and consistently as to 
permit the application of no inconsistent rule. To Sir John Salmond, 
customary law embraces "any rule of action which is actually observed by 
men-any rule which is the expression of some actual uniformity of 
voluntary action," irrespective of whether it is obligatory and enforceable or 
exists by reason of de facto obser~ance. '~ 
What of ancient codes, such as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi? 
Ordinarily, early codes reflected efforts to gather, rationalize, and organize 
already extant customary law. For all that is apparent, Hammurabi himself 
intended that his law reconcile wrongs and bring justice to those 
aggrieved.14 His unmistakable goal was the economic stability and 
enhancement of the people.15 By way of further example, the Rules of 
Punishment for Tibetans have been interpreted as "an attempt to standardize 
. . . folk-law by removing authority from the local chieftains and 
monasteries."16 It is therefore not surprising that the antecedents of 
customary law have often included folk law, folk custom, and folk tales. In 
the many examples of primitive and ancient law to follow, it is seen that the 
norms of conduct, be they characterized as folk law, custom, or otherwise, 
were enforced not by any leadership of the community but rather by the 
whole. 
Sometimes in literate societies, and invariably in preliterate ones, folk 
laws and customs, as well as folk tales, were dispersed and preserved orally. 
A culture's oral tradition has been described as a tradition that "represents 
the complete information deemed essential, retained and codified by a 
society, primarily in oral form, in order to facilitate its memorization and 
ensure its dissemination to present and future generations."" 
Of great significance too was the cultural watershed of symboling, 
including writing. Man's capacity for symbolic communication accelerated 
the development and communication of norms. The characteristic of all 
such norms was that they confined the realm of permissible behaviors.18 
This higher level capacity of man to communicate in endurable form was 
more than a boon; with increasing populations and social complexities 
attendant thereto, it was an absolute essential to s~rvival . '~  Without 
13. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 30-31 (8th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 1930). 
14. See generally RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW (2000). 
15. Id. 
16. Yii Li, supra note 4, at 520. 
17. A. Raphael Ndiaye, Oral Tradition: From Collection to Digitization 1 (65th 
International Federation of Library Associations & Institutions Conference) (1999). 
18. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 67-68 (1 973). 
19. Of course, the human mentality did not come into being and thereupon structure 
culture around human needs. Rather, the development of an "encephalated nervous system . . . 
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symboling, the communication of norms could only survive in a state of 
enduring retardation, confined to the lumbering and limited means of oral 
communication. And without norms human life would fall into chaos. As 
put by Langer, "[Man] can adapt himself somehow to anything his 
imagination can cope with; but he cannot deal with Increasingly, 
therefore, without symboling the generational and geographic transmittal of 
norms would lag behind societies' expanding needs. 
Thus, early man needed norms and proscriptions to permit his very 
survival. Even before the advent of kingdoms, there was a premium on 
keeping the "king's peace," even in large human groupings, which could be 
described as units of the earliest proto civilizations. These norms and 
proscriptions have been described loosely as "natural law," and form the 
foundation of all modem law. Hobbes placed the source of natural law as 
"reason," writing in Leviathan: "Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of 
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles are they 
which otherwise are called the Lawes of ~ a t u r e . " ~ '  T.E. Holland describes 
the rights conferred by natural law as these: "I. To personal safety and 
freedom[;] II. To society and control of one's family and dependents[;] III. 
To reputation[;] IV. To advantages open to the community generally; such 
as the free exercise of one's calling[;] V. To possession and ownership [; 
and ] VI. To immunity from damage by fraud."" 
The discussion to follow in the next section of this article will validate 
Hobbes' recitation in that it will show that the norms and customs to which 
man turned his attention from the earliest times bear a similarity-regular if 
not perfect-to the natural law described by Hobbes and other later 
theorists. 
A. Nuisance and Disturbing the Peace 
Throughout primitive and ancient law are examples of strictures 
suggesting that the social group placed a greater premium on restoring order 
and good will than it did on determining that one disputant was right and 
[and the] . . . capacity to create and use symbols" did not merely permit man to develop culture, 
it "demand[ed] that he do so if [man was] to function at all." Id. 
20. Id. at 99 (quoting SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 287 (1942)). 
21. THOMAS ERSKlNE HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 34 (10th ed. 1910) 
(quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Univ. Press 1904) ( 1  65 1)). 
22. Id. at 169. 
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the other was wrong. In Australian aboriginal customary law, for example, 
the objective or resolution of a dispute would more often be the quieting of 
temper and the restoration of a placid community than it would be any strict 
identification of which party was at fault.23 
Tibetan folk law demonstrates numerous examples of remedies for what 
today might be termed "public nuisance." In the Rules of Punishment for 
Tibetans, Rule No. 26, titled "Making Fire to Burn Wild Animals out of 
Their Lairs," vests in the individual who discovers the infraction the remedy 
of fining the hunter "1 'nine."'24 Reposing the remedy in the person 
discovering the delict might at fust seem like an example of the "special 
injury" rule in public nuisance, in that an individual may bring the claim. 
Yet in this "Fire Rule," there is no articulated need that the reporting 
individuaVclaimant have suffered any injury at all.25 Perhaps the rule simply 
stands as an example of a public nuisance proceeding that can be brought 
not only by public officials but also by individuals, with the inclusion of 
individuals seen as a prudential device to increase deterrence by increasing 
detection. 
Penalty provisions referencing one or more "nines" or one or more 
"animals" were enforceable with reference to Rule No. 39, which detailed 
how these terms correlated with livestock: 
One 'nine' means a combination of nine animals such as 2 horses, 
2 dso, 2 three-year-old cows, 1 two-year-old cow. 'Five animals' 
means 1 dso, 1 cow, 1 three-year-old cow, and 2 two-year cows. 
The person who comes to demand these fines is entitled to receive 
as his fee 1 three-year-old cow from the guilty. In places where 
horses are not plentiful dso may be offered in their stead.26 
Further to the theme of norms directed principally at maintaining peace 
and quiet, among the Pygmies living in the Ituri Forest of the former Congo, 
there has long been a saying that "a noisy camp is a hungry camp."27 This 
proposition is so because the Pygmies are hunters, and as is self-evident, 
unnecessary noise drives the game deeper into the forest.28 As it might be 
23. Kenneth Maddock, Aboriginal Customary Law, in ABORIGINES AND THE LAW 2 12,232 
(Peter Hanks & Bryan Keon-Cohen eds., 1984). Maddock references the effect of "community 
opinion about the merits of a case as helping to decide the outcome through its influence on 
both the disputants and their potential supporters . . . ." Id. (citing L. R. HIA-IT, KINSHIP AND 
CONFLICT: A STUDY IN AN ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY OF NORTHERN ARNHEM LAND 14647 
(1965)). 
24. Yii Li, supra note 4, at 526. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 529. 
27. COLIN M. TURNBULL, ' I ~ E  FOREST PEOPLE 120 (1962). 
28. Id. 
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today, and yet for different reasons, noise that is unreasonable in its volume, 
timing, or location may be treated as a nuisance. Anthropologist Colin 
Turnbull records an incident in which the father of an attractive village girl 
chased away a suitor and persisted in his tirade by taking a position in the 
middle of the village, calling for others to support him. That failing, the 
father took to rattling the roofs of the surrounding huts.29 An elder 
interceded in a calm voice: "You are making too much noise-you are 
killing the forest, you are killing the hunt. It is for us older men to sleep at 
night and not to worry about the youngsters. They know what to do and 
what not to do."30 Evidently displeased, the father nevertheless accepted the 
res~lution.~' 
Under Roman Law, the Institutes of Justinian included rules that reveal 
numerous restrictions against the imposition of one's will over the rights of 
a neighbor. Specifically as to urban estates is Book 11, Title 111, para. 1, in 
which there is a prohibition on the obstruction of a neighbor's view.32 In 
another notable example, pertaining to what would today be called the law 
of private nuisance or trespass, a provision goes so far as to detail a 
preference that adjoining landowners bargain in advance for agreement as to 
contemporaneous uses of land that might trigger dispute. In Book 111, Title 
III, para. 4, the Institutes provide that one wishing to create such a right of 
usage should do so by pacts and  stipulation^.^^ A testator of land may 
impose any such agreements reached upon his heirs, including limitations 
upon building height, obstruction of light, introduction of a beam into a 
common wall, the construction of a catch for a cistern, an easement of 
passage, or a right of way to water.34 These last examples reflect a clear 
preference for ex ante bargaining over economically wasteful ex post 
dispute resolution. The provision permitting the testator to bind his heirs to 
any such agreement is additionally efficient in a manner akin to the 
approach that was taken later and famously by Justice Bergen in the cement 
plant nuisance case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement C O . , ~ ~  who ensured that 
the award of damages would be indeed a one-time resolution of the dispute 
by requiring that the disposition of the claim be entered and recorded as a 
permanent servitude on the land. 
- 
29. Id. at 119. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 3, para. 1 (JAC Thomas trans. North Holland 
Publishing Co. 1975). 
33. Id. at bk. 2, tit. 3, para. 4. 
34. Id. 
35. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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As to private nuisance in ancient Mesopotamia, the codified customary 
law provided specifically for redress should one's irrigation waters 
overflow onto another's property or crops. Particularly harsh legal 
consequences might be visited upon the landowner who failed to contain his 
irrigation canals, as flooding of the water might "result not only in leaving 
crops and cattle dry and parched in one part, but also widespread floods in 
another part of a d i s t r i~ t . "~~  In a simple case only involving damaged grain, 
replacement of a like amount might give sufficient remedy.37 But an 
unmistakable message of potentially severe penalties would be clear to 
those knowing that should the careless farmer be unable to replace the 
grain, the neighbors might be permitted to sell his property and sell him into 
slavery to achieve justice.38 
B. Manslaughter or Wrongful Death 
At Sura 4, the Koran prohibits, unsurprisingly, the intentional killing of a 
believer.39 In traditional Islamic law, the unintended killing of another 
would warrant payment of a full diyet, or blood-money, set at 3.8 grams of 
silver.40 Should a believer be killed by "mischance," i.e., accident, the 
responsible party "shall be bound to free a believer from slavery; and the 
blood-money shall be paid to the family of the slain, unless they convert it 
into alms."41 Killing in self-defense would be unpunished. Lawrence Rosen 
gives an example of the limitations on the defense with the example of one 
Zeyd, who attacked A m .  Reviewed by the mufti, it was noted that A m  
could have rescued himself by calling for help, thus denying him the 
privilege of self-defense.42 
There are numerous Eastern examples of the treatment of unintentional 
killing as an offense redressable in money or other damages. In ancient 
India, if a person were accidentally killed by an animal-drawn vehicle, the 
driver would be subjected to the same monetary liability as would be 
36. VERSTEEG, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting G.R. DRNER & JOHN C. MILLS, THE 
BA~YLONIAN LAWS 152 (1952)). 
37. Id. (citing Laws of Hammurabi $ 53). 
38. Id. (citing Laws of Hammurabi $ 53); see also Raymond Westbrook, Slave and Master 
in Ancient Near Eastern Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1631, 1644 (1995). 
39. THE KORAN, 4:93 (J.M. Rodwell trans., Everyman 1994). 
40. HAEM GERBER, STATE, SOCIETY, AND LAW IN ISLAM 33 (1 994). 
41. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 4:93. 
42. GERBER, supra note 40, at 52 (citing Lawrence Rosen, Responsibility and 
Compensatory Justice in Arab Law and Culture, in SEMIOTICS, ELF, AND SOCIETY 101-19 
(Benjamin Lee & Greg Urban eds., 1989). 
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imposed upon a thief of a chattel of equivalent value.43 In China, for injuries 
resulting in death, traditional law distinguished between intentional killing 
and accidental killing. T'ang Code Article 339 provided that "[all1 cases of 
accidentally (kuo shih) killing or injuring someone follow the manner in 
which the death occurs and treat as redeemable."44 By "redeemable" it is 
meant that the offense may be expiated by the payment of money to the 
victim's The analogous provision in the Ch'ing Code describes 
accidental killing (wu sha) in the context of hunting for game (hsi  ha).^^ It 
states that for an accidental killing the punishment should be the same as for 
a killing in a fight, except that "redemption is permitted."47 The Ch'ing 
Code gives examples of an accidental death such as: "where one is shooting 
wild animals or for some reason is throwing bricks or tiles"; climbing and 
one's fall causes others to fall; navigating a boat by sail, riding a horse that 
becomes frightened, driving a cart downhill, or lifting an object when 
"[one] lacks the strength to sustain it and someone else is harmed."48 In each 
such instance, when "there has been no intention to harm," the Code 
provides that "the sentence is to conform to the punishment for killing or 
injuring in a fight," except that redemption is permitted, with "the money to 
be given to the family of the person killed or injured as a contribution to 
funeral or medical expenses."49 
C. Assault and Battery 
It is a historical verity that intentional battery is an offense that creates a 
high risk of retaliation; or self-help, or "blood feud" between kinship 
groups. Yet some native Indian groups even while making allowance for 
such violent responses, provided simultaneously for the peaceable 
intercession of village council.50 In the Asian context, numerous Indian 
groups, in contrast, demonstrate, without exceptions, "a general disapproval 
of 'retaliation as a means of obtaining justice."'51 
43. THE LAW CODE OF MANU 145 (Patrick Olivelle trans., Oxford University Press 2004) 
[hereinafter CODE OF MANU]. 
44. GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 38 ( 1  996). 
45. Id. at 39. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Upendra Baxi, People's Law in India - The Hindu Society, in ASIAN INDIGENOUS 
LAW: IN INTERACTION WITH RECEIVED LAW 251 (Masaji Chiba ed., 1986) [hereinafter ASIAN 
INDIGENOUS LAW] (addressing indigenous law governing the Konyak Nagas of India). 
5 1 .  Id. at 253 (reciting the Law of Gond in India). 
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Putting aside its punishment of death for one who strikes his mother or 
father,52 under the Torah one who inflicts a direct nonmortal blow to 
another will not be liable if the victim is able to get up and about, "even 
with a stick," providing an interesting early invocation of the principle de 
minimis non curat Z ~ X . ~ ~  If, however, the injury is sufficiently serious that 
the victim is temporarily incapacitated, the aggressor "must compensate 
him . . . for his enforced inactivity, and care for him until he is completely 
cured."54 This approach contemplates not only recovery for what is today 
termed economic loss (compensation for "enforced inactivity"), but also 
rehabilitation expenses. 
In Islamic law, compensatory justice for injurious battery might provide 
for damages according to a schedule keyed to the severity of the harm, 
rather as does modem workers compensation. Liability might be according 
to diyet, or b l o ~ d - m o n e ~ . ~ ~  
Full blood-money due for the unintentional death of the victim was set at 
10,000 dirham, or 3.8 grams of silver.56 Serious injury to the hand, the leg, 
or the eye was compensable with half blood-money.57 Loss of a tooth might 
warrant 1/20 blood-money.58 
The Koran is not pacifistic by any means, and does not feign to offer by 
its rules remedies to persons that may avoid injury by resort to self-help, or 
by means of retaliation. While the Koran explains that God does not 
countenance attacking others first, Muslims may "fight for the cause of God 
against those who fight against you[.]"59 Is it then paradoxical that it may 
be true that, as some scholars claim, "the function of law in Islam is merely 
to get people back on a negotiating track"?60 This perception pertains 
instead to a goal that the state attend to affairs of government, not religion. 
Islam, in turn, attends to religion, and not to the state, and that it is in these 
subject matters that the "negotiating" ideal  obtain^.^' Within the tribal 
52. "Anyone who strikes his father or mother must die. Anyone who abducts a man- 
whether he has sold him or is found in possession of him-must die. Anyone who curses father 
or mother must die." Exod. 21:15-17 (The Jerusalem Bible). 
53. Id. at 21:19. 
54. Id. at 21:18-19. 
55. GERBER, supra note 40, at 33. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 35. 
58. Id. 
59. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 2:186. 
60. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE 61 (1989), quoted in GERBER, 
supra note 40, at 59. "ln the classical Islamic theory of the state . . . . [Tlhe state was seen not as 
the instrument for the application of law, nor were the courts . . . envisioned as vehicles for 
economic redistribution or the construction of a particular political order." Id. 
61. Id. 
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customary law of the Awlad Ali of Egypt, for battery resulting in injury, 
diyah or blood-money, would be paid to the family of the victim, together 
with kebara, calculated in money and animals.62 
Under the Rules of Punishment for Tibetans, battery could incur variable 
fines depending upon the severity of injury. A fine of three "nines" would 
be levied for a fight resulting in an injury to the eye, hand, or foot. If the 
injury was such as could be cured, the fine was one "nine," as was true also 
for a fight causing broken teeth, or an abortion.63 When hair would be tom 
off, the fine was five animals.@ 
In ancient Indian law, the "low born" were treated very differentially 
than were the Brahmins. For injurious assaults against one of a superior 
caste, punishment ranged from amputation of the limb used by the assailant 
to banishment or exile, or for spitting on one's superior, the cutting off of 
the assailant's lips.65 Other aggression causing injury and pain to another (or 
to an animal) called for the king to "impose a punishment proportionate to 
the severity of the pain."66 
Lastly, pursuant to Greek law, striking another gave rise to a private 
cause of action in battery (dike ~ikeias).~'  If liability was found, it was 
ordinarily against the one striking the first The penalty was an 
amount payable in money damages as assessed by a jury.69 
D. Trespass to Land and Chattels 
In the authoritative and ancient work Manu, entitled alternatively The 
Law Code of Manu or Manava Dhamasastra, the text references ancient 
Indian law governing the trespass of animals.70 For such fields surrounding 
a settlement as are left open, any farm animal damage to crops should not 
be punished." To receive any protection for one's fields, a person "should 
erect there a fence over which a camel cannot look and cover every hole 
through which a dog or pig could poke its head."72 For damage caused by 
ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note 50, at 65. 
Yii Li, supra note 4,  at 526 (citing Rule 28, Rules of Punishment for Tibetans). 
Id. 
CODE OF MANU, supra note 43, at 144. 
Id. 
MACDOWELL, supra note 2, at 123 (citing Demosthenes, 47.45-7, 47.64; Isokrates, 
Id. 
Id. 
CODE OF MANU, supra note 43, at 141. 
Id. 
Id. 
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herded livestock to such fenced land, a fine of 100 panas should be 
imposed-and if the livestock are unherded, they should be impounded.73 
For livestock damage to other fields, "one and a half [planas should be 
assessed for each animal," and the owner of the land should be compensated 
for any crop loss.74 
Prior to the Laws of Hammurabi, the Laws of King Ur-Nammu and the 
Laws of Lipit-Ishtar were p ~ b l i s h e d . ~ ~  Read together as principal sources of 
the law of ancient Babylonia, there is seen an emphasis on the protection of 
person, property, and commerce from forced divestiture of a right or a 
prerogative.76 Regarding navigation, a collision between two boats on a 
body of water having a perceptible upstream and downstream would trigger 
a presumption of fault on the part of the upstream captain, on the logic- 
faulty or not-that the upstream captain had a greater opportunity to reduce 
avoidable accidents than did his counterpart, as the former would be 
traveling at a slower speed.77 
Anglo-American common law trespass includes numerous instances in 
which a landowner is held liable in trespass if a structure or an activity on 
the first individual's property causes damages, by diversion of water or 
otherwise, to the land of another. The account Against Kallikles is found in 
Athenian law, recorded by Demosthenes, in which it appears that Kallikles 
and a neighbor both lived on a hill~ide.'~ Kallikles's neighbor constructed a 
wall to protect his land from water runoff from rainfall, which served this 
purpose, but also diverted water onto his Kallikles's property.79 Kallikles 
brought a suit because his property was damaged due to his neighbor's 
By Demosthenes' account, if found guilty for this trespass, Kallikles 
would be fined in damages (dike blabes) a sum of 1000 drachmas." 
In ancient Athens, an action for destruction of, or damage to, chattels 
was defined in a way as to merge the modern notions of trespass to chattels 
and conversion. An action for "damage" could be brought for any "physical 
-- - -- - 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See VERSTEEG, supra note 14, at 18. 
76. Id. at 22-26. 
77. Id. at 130 (referencing G. R. DRIVER AND JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 
431-32 (1952)). The author questions the reliability of this, as to the author's limited 
knowledge, in an encounter with an upstream boat, the downstream boat is the boat fighting the 
current. Irrespective, the point made is the same. Id. 
78. MACDOWELL, supra note 2, at 136-37 (citing H. J. Wolff, The Dikh Blabhs in 
Demosthenes, O.R., LV. 64 Am. J. Philology 316 (1943)). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 136-37. 
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damage to a piece of property, such as to destroy it or make it useless or less 
valuable than before, but without taking it away . . . . ,382 
Tibetan folk law includes. methods of economic recovery, recovery in 
kind, and punitive consequences that bespeak strong deterrence  objective^.^^ 
Should one's trespassing cattle damage another's field, the owner of the 
field may seize the cattle pending payment for the damage.84 Should the 
land at issue not be a field but instead a pasture utilized by nomads for the 
grazing of their animals, Tibetan folk law proscribes the trespassing of one 
nomadic tribe's cattle on the pasture of another tribe. Again, the trespassing 
cattle may be seized pending payment for the harm done. Should the 
grazing be done in the course of a caravan's passage through the territory of 
another tribe, a pristinely market-based transaction is expected. The 
traveling tribe offers to the local tribal chieftain a gift of "grass money," to 
compensate for the grass the herd is expected to graze.85 
The Rules of Punishment for Tibetans contains provisions for the 
conversion of another's animals.86 Rule No. 30, "Injury to Other People's 
Animals," states that should the animal of another be killed, the perpetrator 
is fined one "nine," and also must pay the full value of the animal to the 
owner.87 If a horse is shot and killed, two horses must be given in 
compensation. If the horse is only injured, a fine of a two-year-old cow is 
levied.88 
In ancient India, should a cart or coach kill a large animal (such as a cow 
or an elephant), its owner (if the driver was unskilled) would be fined half 
the amount that would be applicable if the offense had been theft.89 For the 
similar death of a small farm animal, the fine would be 200 panas; for a 
"beautiful animal" or a bird, the fine would be 50 panas, and for a donkey, a 
sheep or a goat, 5 m~sas .~ '  
E. Conversion or  Theji 
During the Egyptian Sixth Dynasty, from approximately 2460 to 2200 
B.C., the law bled together the notions of theft as a criminal action as 
82. Id. at 149 (quoting Demosthenes, Against Kallikles 2150). 
83. See generally Yii Li, supra note 4. 
84. Id. at 5 16. 
85. Id. at 51617 .  
86. Id. at 527. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. CODE OF MANU, supra note 43, at 145. 
90. Id. 
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opposed to conversion, to be prosecuted by a civil ~omplainant.~' During 
the reign of Pepi I, c. 2325, a prosecutor named Weni was appointed, and he 
presided over these and other matters.92 His recitations of the suits brought 
before him gives evidence of the law employed and the remedies exacted.93 
Weni recounts being sent by the king "to prevent [the army] from taking 
bread or sandals from a wayfarer, to prevent any one of them from taking a 
loin-cloth from any village, [and] to prevent any one of them from taking 
any goat from any people."94 Upon a finding of responsibility, the remedy 
exacted would typically be that of requiring the thief to return any stolen 
goods to the victim, and also payment to the victim of money damages in 
the amount of two to three times the value of the property stolen.95 
For the wrong of conversion, ancient Greece followed an approach 
consistent with that of so-called "civilized" societies and pre-literate 
societies alike throughout the world. That approach was a two-pronged 
response to conversion of chattels.96 First, the wrongdoer must give up the 
wrongfully gained property. Second, the perpetrator should be punished.97 
Following successful prosecution of a claim for theft (dike klopes), the 
punishment might be the payment of a fine gauged at twice the value of the 
property.98 In egregious instances, an additional penalty of time in public 
stocks might be imposed.99 
For some theft, the remedy would be restitution in some fixed amount, or 
in a multiple of the value of what was stolen.100 The same would be required 
of any knowing receiver of any such stolen  good^.'^' In comparison, among 
Indian indigenous groups, cash fines might be levied for petty thefts.lo2 
91. See RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN ANCIENT E G ~  151-52 (2002) [hereinafter LAW IN 
ANCIENT EGYPT]. This absence of a distinction between which rules might be criminal, and 
enforced by the state, and which would be civil, leaving the wronged individual to pursue a 
claim for damages, continued through Roman law and beyond. See generally M. Stuart Madden, 
Graeco-Roman Antecedents of Modern Tort Law, BRANDEIS L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
92. LAW IN A N C I E N T E G ~ ,  supra note 91, at 85, 161. 
93. Id. at 161. 
94. Id. (quoting SIR ALAN GARDINER, EGYPT OF THE PHARAOHS 96 (1 96 1)). 
95. Id. at 162 (citing ANDREA MCDOWELL, JURISDICTION IN THE WORKMEN'S COMMUNITY 
OF DEIR EL-MEDINA 230 (1 990)). 
96. MACDOWELL, supra note 2, at 147-48. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 148 (citing Demosthenes, Against Timocrates 24.105. 24.1 14; Lysias, Against 
Philokrates 29.1 1). 
99. Id. 
100. Raymond Westbrook, The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law, in A HISTORY OF 
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW 1,81 (Raymond Westbrook ed., 2003). 
101. Id.; MACDOWELL, supra note 2, at 148. 
102. ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note 50, at 216-39. 
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As with Native Americans, among certain African tribes theft is rare.Io3 
One anthropologist assigned one reason to be that the tribal members have 
few individual possessions.104 However, other delicts resembling theft might 
be treated with great seriousness. Among the Pygmies living in the Ituri 
Forest, mentioned earlier, of the former Congo, the men hunted as groups, 
with some acting as beaters to drive game in a certain direction, and the 
others setting nets at agreed-upon locations.105 As Colin Turnbull describes 
it, "In a small and tightly knit hunting band, survival can be achieved only 
by the closest co-operation and by an elaborate system of reciprocal 
obligations which insures that everyone has some share in the day's catch. 
Some days one gets more than others, but nobody ever goes without."'06 In 
one incident that Turnbull recorded, a member of the hunting party set up 
his nets in a place that garnered for him a comparative advantage over the 
others. Brought to task, the hunter returned to camp and "ordered his wife to 
hand over the spoils."107 Interestingly, the wrongdoer's amenability to 
accept this result might have been affected by his recognition that he could 
not, as a practical matter, defy it.''' He likely recognized that he was not in a 
position to break away from his group, as "his band of four or five families 
was too small to make an efficient hunting unit."109 More generally, for theft 
among the Pygmies, the punishment for the frustrated nocturnal theft of 
food from a neighbor's pot, might include public whipping or shunning.lI0 
All bodies of folk law reveal norms against conversion. For Tibetans, 
pursuant to the Rules for Punishment of Tibetans, a theft of domestic 
animals such as "dogs [or] pigs" could result in a fine, recoverable by the 
wronged party, of five animals."' Theft of other domestic animals, such as 
fowl, was treated variously, with conversion of fowls punishable by a fine 
of a three-year-old cow."2 Additionally, in each instance the stolen animal 
had to be returned.ll3 This latter requirement converts the restitutionary 
objective of the rule into a hybrid rule that is at once restitutionary and 
punitive. 
103. TURNBULL, supra note 27, at 120. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. at97-101. 
106. Id. at 107. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See id. at 120-21. 
1 1  1. Yii Li, supra note 4,  at 525. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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For theft of personalty ("gold, silver, sable, otter-skin, hides, money, 
cloth, food, etc."),'I4 the malefactor was required to return property "of 
equal value." In addition, fines would be imposed, keyed to the value of the 
stolen goods, e.g., three "nines" for the theft of a two-and-one-half-year-old 
cow; one "nine" for a sheep; and a three-year-old cow for the theft of an 
animal of lesser value than a sheep.ll5 
Conversion or theft is prohibited of Muslims. As expressed in Sura 7, 
"Give . . . the full in measures and weights; take from no man his chattels, 
and commit no disorder on the earth after it has been made so good."'16 
Muslims on pilgrimage are instructed to kill no game in the lands through 
which they journey. If such game is purposefully killed, the person 
responsible shall compensate for it "in domestic animals of equal value (as 
determined by two persons in the group), or feed the poor, or fast "that he 
may taste the ill consequences of his deed.""' Although hunting is 
prohibited for  pilgrim^,"^ it is lawful for them "to fish in the sea."llg The 
same approach, with variations, is found in the customary law of other 
populations. Among the agricultural community of the Konyak Nagas of 
India, conversion might be punished by fines, but the stricter penalty of 
banishment might be reserved for chronic offenders.l2' 
Folk stories, too, have long carried social norms from generation to 
generation. Joel Chandler Harris, in his writing of the Uncle Remus stories, 
comments upon how story and fable transport the listener from the common 
reality of known things into the emotive state of feeling-wherein lay the 
enduring power of oral history and fable.l2l 
One example might be that of an Indian folk tale, in which even the theft 
of a mason's services creates an opportunity for some sanctimonious advice 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 7233. 
117. Id. at 5:96. 
118. Id.; see also id. at 5:97. 
1 19. Id. at 5:97. 
120. ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note 50, at 25 1. 
121. In the course of one story in which Uncle Remus finds himself, in the course of telling 
a story, obliged to feint and weave in response to a boy's inquiry, Hams writes: 
Indeed, one of the queerest results of the old man's manner of telling his 
stories - the charm of which cannot be reproduced in cold type - was that 
all the animals, and all of the various characters that figured therein, were 
taken out of the reality which we know, and transported bodily into that 
realm of reality which we feel: the reality that lies far beyond the 
commonplace, everyday facts that constitute not the least of our womes. 
JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, UNCLE REMUS RETURNS 62- 63 (1918). 
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on victim resp~ns ib i l i t~ . '~~  The story, entitled The Burglar's Gift, describes 
a mason who found himself so in need of work that he agreed to build a 
cellar for a man of suspicious character; indeed, "he was reported to be a 
thief and burglar."'23 The mason completed the work and was invited to the 
burglar's home to receive "his humble reward."'24 Arriving the following 
morning, the mason was distressed to see that he was the only guest, and his 
alarm only grew greater as the burglar's tone grew hostile and he began to 
beat the mason.125 
"I shall return to you every pice [sic] taken in wages," said 
[the mason,] "and the greatest reward for me is to let me go." But 
the appeal fell on deaf ears and the host relished every lash he 
gave to the mason. The latter invoked all the holy angels, the Holy 
Book and God to rid himself of the present misfortune. At last the 
burglar seemed to have got tired and stopped."6 
The beating suspended, the mason gathered himself to go home, only to 
have the burglar bid him to sit down.''' After a fine meal, the burglar 
presented the mason "a malmal (turban) and a five rupee note by way of 
re~ard.'"'~ While confused at "this paradoxical behaviour of the burglar," 
the mason accepted these gifts and asked again to go.lZ9 "'I shall be most 
happy to bid you good-bye after I place a valuable and an everlasting gift at 
your feet,' said the burglar . . . . The burglar continued, 'You did not ask me 
why I belaboured you so heartlessly?"'130 To both of these declarations, the 
mason did not respond.131 
"Look," said the burglar, "what I gave you as tokens of my 
appreciation will last a short while and disappear. What I want to 
give you now will last for ever and is sure to pass from one 
generation to another, and why I gave you a beating thus was to 
imprint the lesson indelibly on your mind and body so that you 
never lose sight of the great truth. The lesson I want you to learn is 
that you need not fear thieves and burglars as long as your doors 
and windows are well bolted and hasped. On the basis of my 
122. S. L. SADHU, FOLK TALES FROM KASHMIR, The Burglar's Gift, Chap. 10, 
http://www.koausa.org/FoWSadhul (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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professional experience my advice to you is that you should 
always keep your windows and doors properly hasped and bolted 
at night to be free of the fear of thieves. You will please excuse me 
for the beating but the lesson had to be rubbed in thoroughly."'32 
F. Negligence 
Some scholars assert that the concept of "the reasonable man" has been 
common to all ancient cultures.133 The historical record seems to provide 
support for this. For example, under ancient Mesopotamian law, a 
wrongdoer that negligently caused personal injury might be responsible for 
the person's medical expenses, with provision too that the duration of the 
remedy take into account for the time the victim was in~a1ided. l~~ This rule, 
it is seen, is quite similar to that contained in the Code of the Covenant 
referenced above.'35 
Further evidence in early Mesopotamian law of the negligence concept 
of duty is found in the identification of a neighbor's duty as it might pertain 
to discourage neighbors from permitting their unoccupied land to elevate a 
risk of trespass or burglary to the nearby property. The Law of Lipit-lshtar 
provided that should a robbery occur, the inattentive neighbor, who had 
notice that his unattended property provided access to the complainant's 
property by potential robbers, would be liable for any h a m  to the 
complainant's home or property.'36 
The Rules of Punishment for Tibetans No. 26, referenced earlier 
regarding its public nuisance  implication^,'^^ also provided that witnesses 
(those "in sight") of a "fire[] caused by carelessness" would be "entitled to 
fine the guilty [five] animals."'38 If the carelessly started fire killed an 
individual, the fine was one "nine."139 Those carelessly handling firearms 
"without justifiable causes," and irrespective of injury, could be fined 
-- - 
132. Id. 
133. GERBER, supra note 40, at 34. The author therein references the administration of 
Islamic law of the Byzantine Empire, a codification of ancient customary law, which contains 
reference to a dispute arising from a claim of a coachman who was alleged to have beaten his 
horses so severely that they bolted and injured a child. From the record it appears that the 
coachman was permitted to interpose the defense that he had acted reasonably, and the 
disputants were permitted to present evidence that he had not. Id. 
134. Westbrook, supra note 100, at 82 (discussing the Laws of Hammurabi § 202, the 
Hittite Law 5 10, and Exod. 21:18-19). 
135. Exod., supra note 52, at 21:18-19. 
136. VERSTEEG, supra note 14, at 135 (discussing Lipit-Ishtar para. 11). 
137. Yii Li, supra note 4, at 526. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. For definitions of "nines," see supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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"[two] nines for Ch'ienhu, [one] nine for Paihu, [seven] animals for 
centurions, [five] animals for lesser centurions, and [three] animals for 
lesser elders and  commoner^."'^^ 
The logic of the "failure to cover a ditch" cases that are a mainstay of 
modem torts casebooks is reflected in Code of the Covenant provisions 
declaring that should one leave a ditch uncovered and an ox or a donkey fall 
into it, he must pay the owner (although he would be permitted to keep the 
dead animal as his own!).141 
Again with reference to harms done due to an actor's breach of a duty of 
reasonable care, in the law of ancient India, there were rules for accidents 
caused by animal-drawn ~ehic1es . l~~  If the driver was unskilled and the 
accident was "due to the driver's incompetence," the owner of the vehicle 
"should be fined 200"; and "all the riders should be fined 100."143 If the 
driver was skilled, he would sustain the fine.144 
G. Strict Liability 
A commonly-cited provision of the Laws of Hammurabi treats the 
imposition of strict liability when one's animal injures another in this 
manner: "If an ox gores an ox and causes its death, the owners of both oxen 
shall divide the value of the live ox and the carcass of the dead ox."145 
Mosaic law provides similarly, and even more forcefully if the incident 
results in the death of a person: "If an ox gore[s] a man or a woman that 
they die, then the ox shall be surely stoned and his flesh shall not be 
eaten."'46 The proscription on eating the animal, which is permitted when an 
ox gores another ox, has been described as a recognition that "the animal 
has killed a superior in the cosmic order, namely a human being."147 The 
entire remedy reveals the premium placed on (1) the cathartic importance of 
some civil remedies (not to mention modem criminal penalties), in this case 
the stoning of the animal; and (2) the importance invested in nature's order, 
i.e., forbidding eating the animal, surely an orderly and "dignified" end for 
such beasts, in that it offended such order. 
- - - - - 
140. Id. 
141. Exod., supra note 52, at 21 :33-34. 
142. CODE OF MANU, supra note 43, at 144-45. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Westbrook, supra note 100, at 17. 
146. S ~ O N D ,  supra note 13, at 431 (quoting Exod., supra note 52, at 21:28). 
147. Westbrook, supra note 100, at 77. 
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The Code of the Covenant addresses the issue somewhat more 
particularly. There is no strict liability if the ox has not gored before. The 
penalty will be that the ox be stoned, and its flesh uneaten. If, on the other 
hand, the ox "has been in the habit of goring before," and its owner is aware 
of this, if the ox kills "a man or woman, the ox must be stoned and its owner 
put to death."148 In a seeming endeavor to ameliorate such harsh 
consequences, the Code also states that if instead the careless owner has 
assigned to him a "ransom," he must "pay whatever is imposed, to redeem 
his life."'49 Deaths of children are treated with markedly less severity, as the 
payment of a ransom is the sole prescribed punishment, and the goring of a 
slave presumptively even less severely-the stoning of the ox and the 
payment of thirty shekels.l5' 
Such forms of strict liability have persisted to this day. Using an example 
of Salmond's: "If my horse or my ox escapes from my land to that of 
another man, I am answerable for it without any proof of negligence."15' 
While this application of strict liability for trespass may be based on a 
reasonable presumption of negligence upon such occurrences, Salmond 
suggests that its truer origins may be in a vicarious liability, placing upon 
the owner of property responsibility for injuries caused by such property, 
such as a master's responsibility for the actions of his slaves under Roman 
H. Defamation and False Witness 
In the speech Against Konon, Demosthenes gives a very clear public 
order rationale for a civil action for slander in these words: "For instance, 
there are cases of slander; these, they say, were instituted in order that men 
who are abused should not be induced to hit one another."lS3 
Several ancient cultures evidently considered defamation or false witness 
to have such a corrosive effect on the public peace and order as to require 
the most severe penalties. In ancient Egypt, one tried for defamation could, 
as today, interpose truth as a defense. Interestingly, if found liable, the 
libelant was not punished for this first transgression. Instead, he or she was 
required to take an "oath of mutilation," covenanting that they would 
148. Exod., supra note 52, at 21:28-30. 
149. Id. at 21:30-31. 
150. Id. at 21:3 1-32. 
151. SALMOND, supra note 13, at 430-31, (citing Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10, C. P. 10 
(1 874)). 
152. Id. at 431. 
153. MACDOWELL, supra note 2, at 123 (quoting Demonsthenes, Against Konon 54.17-19). 
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submit to amputation of their nose, ears, or both should they engage in a 
further transgre~sion.'~~ In the Koran, Sura 104 condemns "every backbiter, 
defamer."'55 Though the believer may, as is common to cultures old and 
new, trust in amassed wealth, the defamer is admonished to bear in mind 
"being flung into the Crushing  ire."'^^ 
- Elsewhere, the Koran condemns anyone defaming a "virtuous" woman 
unless the author of the writing or utterance has four witnesses who support 
the account.'s7 Without the witnesses, in which Sura 24 is seemingly more 
interested than whether or not the account is true, the responsible party will 
receive "fourscore stripes," and is barred in perpetuity from giving 
testimony.15* Should a husband accuse his wife, the word of God was to pay 
no heed to the testimony of witnesses and instead required the husband to 
first testify four times as to the truth of the accu~at ion. '~~ When the husband 
repeated the accusation the fifth time, should he be untruthful, "the malison 
of God be upon him."160 If in his fifth oath the husband speaks the truth, it 
will "call down the wrath of God" upon the wife.16' Republishers of a 
defamation too would face a "sore" p~nishment . '~~  
Variations in the severity of the response to a delict might turn upon the 
status of the victim. Under ancient Indian law, defamation of a Brahmin by 
one of a lesser caste might be punished corporally.'63 For more prosaic libel 
and slander between social equivalents, a fine would be the suitable 
punishment.'@ This differentiation seems to be the exception that tests the 
rule of equal protection often, but not invariably, represented throughout 
ancient law. '65 
154. LAW rn ANCIENT EGYPT, supra note 91, at 179 (citing Ellen Bedell, Criminal Law in 
the Egyptian Ramesside Period 138 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis 
University). 
155. RIE KORAN, supra note 39, at 104:l. 
156. Id. at 1044. 
157. Id. at 24:4. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 24:6. 
160. Id. at 24:7. 
161. Id. at 24:9. 
162. Id. at 24:18. 
163. CODE OFMANU, supra note 43, at 143. 
164. "If a man arrogantly makes false statements about someone's learning, country, caste, 
occupation, or physical features, he should be fined 200. If a man calls someone 'one-eyed,' 
'lame,' or some other similar name, he should be fined at least [one] karsapana, even if what he 
says is true." Id. It is noteworthy that these examples hew to the modem limitation upon 
defamation as relating solely to false statements of fact, and excluding opinion, such as, e.g., 
"miserly" or stupid." 
165. For example, inscribed on the tomb of the Egyptian Vizier Rekhmire (1479-1425 
B.C.) is: "I judged both [the insignificant] and the influential; I rescued the weak man from the 
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Pursuant to Mesopotamian law, should the slander pertain to the sexual 
honor of another, the punishment might be shaming or f10gging.I~~ This 
was true also of the Torah.'67 Later scholars, including Locke, would 
describe such rules as those of "positive rn~rality," '~~ or "the law of opinion 
or of reputation."169 These rules "consist[] of the rules imposed by society 
upon its members and enforced by public censure or di~ap~robation." '~~ 
I. Deceit and False Report 
In our time, we can refer to the children's expression "Cross my heart 
and hope to die" as an affirmation of the community's disapproval of 
deceit.171 The proscription of trespass to chattels or conversion, the 
occurrence of which has always been common to the playground, remains 
imbedded in several children's rhymes that indicate a strong community 
aversion to any initiative by a giver of goods to engage in self-help to regain 
possession.'72 One such folk axiom is found in a French children's rhyme, 
reduced in writing as "[olnce given, stays given; [tlaking away is 
  tea ling!""^ More severe consequences are suggested in a saying attributed 
to Dutch, Flemish, German and French children, to this effect: "Once given, 
taken away, [g]o to Hell three times."174 
Prohibitions upon the making of false reports have been quite common 
throughout legal systems or groupings of legal norms. The Koran provides 
that one committing a crime or an "involuntary fault" (suggesting 
negligence or even blamelessness), but who then "layeth [the blame] on the 
I 
strong man; I deflected the fury of the evil man and subdued the greedy man in his hour . . . . I 
was not at all deaf to the indigent." LAW IN ANCIENT EGYFT, supra note 91, at 23 (quoting 
T.G.H. JMES, PHARAOH'S PEOPLE: SCENES FROM LIFE IN IMPERIAL EGYPT 57 (1984)). 
166. Westbrook, supra note 100, at 81 (citing the Laws of Hammurabi 5 127 and the 
Middle Assyrian Laws $5 17-19). 
167. Deut. 22:13-19 (The Jerusalem Bible). 
168. SALMOND, supra note 13, at 21. 
169. Id. (referring to JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING, bk.
2, ch. 28 5 7 (5th ed. 1848)). The inclusion here of a potential punishment for opinion may be 
explained by the sanctity accorded one's reputation for sexual probity. This would in later times 
be manifest is such rules of law defining slander per se as including false statements as to 
another's sexual conduct. 
170. JOHN SAMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 47 (2d ed. 1907). 
171. See A.F. Chamberlain, Legal Folklore of Children, 16 J. AM. FOLKLORE 280 (1903), 
reprinted in FOLK LAW, supra note 4, at 417-19. 
172. In general terms, as has often been put, "[tlhe common law does not favor self help." 
A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
(1973), reprinted in FOLK LAW, supra note 4, at 121. 
173. Chamberlain, supra note 171, at 419. 
174. Id. 
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innocent" will be punished by being required to "bear the guilt of calumny 
and of a manifest crime."'75 
In Tibetan folk law, deceit regarding the ownership of animals was 
punishable more severely than even the intentional killing of an animal. 
Within its rules regarding lost animals, Rule 31 of the Rules of Punishment 
for Tibetans provided for a fine of three "nines" for anyone "falsely 
claim[ing] possession of such an animal," and one "nine" for anyone 
attempting to hide them.176 In other instances, too, the punishment of deceit 
exceeded that applicable to delicts involving arguably less economic 
dislocation. An individual falsely reporting a theft could be fined three 
"nines," with the fine distributable equally "between the elder in charge and 
the person falsely charged."177 Vigilance against deceit is manifest further in 
Rule 19, pertaining to land transfers. For any new transferee who discovers 
"tracesyy of another's pasturage within three days of the vesting of the 
transferred interest, the new transferee must so report within three days. The 
transferor must thereupon "swear an oath" that no competing pasturage or 
third-party rights exist on the land.178 The acceleration of the "limitations" 
period for a claim arising from this wrong seems sensible in a setting in 
which the effect of grazing will disappear within days, and with it, the 
possibility of proof. 
The Koran reflects God's prohibition of deceit, as followers are enjoined 
to "be not false in your own engagements, with your own knowledge . . . 
Additionally, in the circumstance of a death, the Koran details the 
testimony that must be sworn and the accompanying safeguards against 
deceit. Two "just" men are to be chosen to swear as to the circumstances of 
the death, and included in that oath should be words to the effect that "We 
~ ~ 1 8 0  will not take a bribe though the party be of kin to us . . . . Importantly, 
any oath of the first two men selected can be challenged "if it shall be made 
clear that both have been guilty of a falsehood . . . ."Ig1 Should this occur, 
two other men "nearest in blood" to the first affiants will speak to the 
truth.lg2 The scripture notes with satisfaction that the prospect of a challenge 
to the veracity of the first oaths will facilitate truth telling in the first 
175. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 4: 110-120. 
176. Yii Li, supra note 4, at 527. 
177. Id. at 526. 
178. Id. at 524. 
179. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 8:27. 
180. Id. at 5:106. 
181. Id. at 5:107. 
182. Id. 
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instance: "Thus will it be easier for men to bear a true witness, or fear lest 
after their oath another oath be given."lg3 
Differing from but related to deceit, an act of "imposture" is interpreted 
to mean taking undue advantage of another through the device of being an 
"imposter." It is logical that in defense of the faith adherents to the Koran 
would be sensitive to claims that they themselves were imposters for 
proclaiming Muhammad's words as those of God. To this potential claim, 
Sura 10 reinforces the confidence of believers in declaring what they 
believe to be true in matters of faith with the suggestion that "if they charge 
thee with imposture, then SAY: My work for me, and your work for you. 
Ye are clear of that which I do, and I am clear of that which ye do."lg4 
Elsewhere at Sura 22 believers castigated as imposters are reminded that 
they can recall to their accusers that so many of the great and accepted 
prophets, including Abraham, Noah, and others, were so charged and 
ultimately prevailed.lg5 
J. Covetousness and Hoarding 
Among certain Aleutian groups, cultural and economic norms developed 
to protect limited resources and to deter noncooperative appropriation or 
hoarding.lg6 The indigenous tribes considered natural resources such as 
wildlife not the subject of private, but rather of common ownership, a form 
of distributional necessity among subsistence  culture^.'^' The harsh 
subsistence environment in which the Aleuts dwelt generated rules adhering 
to strict efficiency norms.1sg Among such groups, in the words of one 
scholar, "'life is hard and the margin of safety small, and unproductive 
members of society cannot be ~upported.""~~ It will be seen that to the 
characterization of "unproductive" can be added those whose conduct 
disrupts the allocative efficiencies of the group.lgO Thus, these norms 
183. Id. at 5:108. 
184. Id. at 10:42. 
185. Id. at 22:42-44. 
186. DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 236-37 (1976). 
187. This approach is carried forward today in the United States' recognition of 
collectively-held aboriginal rights to certain fish, wildlife, and marine mammals. Along kindred 
lines, the protection of similar collective rights is the very essence of the law of public nuisance, 
both antiquarian and modem, providing, in different circumstances, remedies against 
interference with rights held jointly by the public in matters of health, safety, and welfare. See 
generally JOHN L. DIAMOND ETAL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS (2d ed. 2001). 
188. See LLOYD, supra note 186, at 237. 
189. Id. (quoting E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954)). 
190. See id. 
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penalize resource overreaching and the arrogation of resources beyond 
one' s needs. 'I 
Similarly, the Aleutians considered the treatment of land as commonly 
held, rather than susceptible of private ownership, to be the most efficient 
manner of maximizing hunting resources. Further, although captured game 
and hunting instruments might be considered private property, the 
community was "strongly hostile to the idea of anybody accumulating too 
much property for himself[,] and thereby limiting the amount of property 
that [could] be effectively used in the The ordinary remedy 
might be confi~cation. '~~ The influential anthropologist Hoebel identified 
one Aleutian grouping that considered keeping an excess amount of goods 
as a "capital crime."'" 
Muslims are warned against the vice of covetousness in such language as 
is found in Sura 113: "SAY: I betake me for refuge to the Lord of the 
DAYBREAK . . . against the mischief of the envier when he en~ ie th . " ' ~~  
Further, "Covet not the gifts by which God hath raised some of you above 
others. The men shall have a portion according to their deserts. The women 
shall have a portion according to their deserts. Of God, therefore, ask of his 
gifts."'96 
An Indian folk tale relates the travails that may follow one who covets 
the wife of another. The story is titled The Village ~ e a c h e r , ' ~ ~  and is told in 
this way: 
Following the passing of a village's old and respected teacher, there 
arrived a new teacher "gifted with all those qualities which make us look 
wistfully on our departed youth: energy, health, ambition, hope and 
vanity."'98 
The vanity of the young school teacher and his condescension together 
prompted him to desire female c'ompanionship, and, in particular, a pretty 
and prosperous housewife. The woman's son attended the school teacher's 
school, and at the closing of school he would tell the boy: "Remember me 
to your mother."lg9 The mother, being both intelligent and perceptive, 
deduced the teacher's motives, and planned her response. One day, the boy 
191. See id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. THE KORAN, supra note 39, at 113:l-5. 
196. Id. at 4:32. 
197. SADHU, The Village Teacher, Chap. 25, in FOLK TALES FROM KASHMIR, supra note 
122. 
198 . Id. 
199 . Id. 
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told the teacher that his mother would like a word with the teacher at her 
home, and, further, that her husband was expected to be away. Quite excited 
and dressed at his best, he arrived at the woman's house, where he was 
received warmly. 
As he drank the proffered tea, a call came from the yard. It was the 
husband. The wife began to tremble. "I am undone," she said, "if he 
discovers you here he will kill me and not spare you either.""' " Have no 
fear," the teacher said, "he cannot be so harsh."201 " I know better how 
ruthless he is," she quickly corrected the increasingly anxious teacher.''' 
"Would to God I were dead rather than be surprised in this compromising 
situation," she said as she began to beat her breast.'03 "IS there no other 
exit?" the teacher asked.204 "No, none," she replied "[and if] [h]e sees you 
here [then] I am killed. . . . Nothing can save me unless . . . . "'05 "Unless 
what?" he interjected.'06 "Unless," she said, "you disguise yourself to 
escape his suspi~ion." '~~ The teacher answered that he would do anything 
for her sake. She gave him a working woman's cloak and scarf, and placed 
him in front of a basket of maize and two rnill~tones.'~~ 
When the husband entered the home, he asked "What is that grinding 
sound up stair^?"''^ His wife told him it was the sound of "[a] deaf woman 
turning out maize AS the husband and his wife passed time "in the 
kitchen garden and in the barn," the teacher wore his hands to blisters 
pretending to be a working woman.211 Revealing his awareness of the ruse, 
the husband said, finally, "The fellow must be tired now and feeling bitter . 
. . [ylou had better dismiss him now. The lesson must have gone home to 
him."212 The housewife gave the teacher his clothes and he left hurriedly. 
The wife and her husband preserved the secret. The people in the village 
remarked the next day that the teacher had lost a great deal of his spirit and 
liveliness. Some time later, the housewife sent a message to the teacher 
-- 
200 . Id. 
201 . Id. 
202 . Id. 
203 . Id. 
204 . Id. 
205 . Id. 
206 . Id. 
207 . Id. 
208 . Id. 
209 . Id. 
210. Id. 
211 .Id. 
212. Id. 
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asking if he should like to visit again. This time he simply responded: "Ask 
her if she has consumed the flour ground previ~usly."~'~ 
Was H. G. Wells correct when he offered a vision of the history of law 
as "based upon a confused foundation of conventions, arbitrary 
assumptions, . . . and [constituting] a very impracticable and antiquated 
3, 214 system indeed ? Every observer must reach his or her own determination. 
To this observer, the preponderant evidence is that law, taken as a whole, 
demonstrates a tropism towards rationality and progressive values. 
The legal subset of tort law is at once discrete and sprawling. The above 
discussion of ancient and primitive law confirms what Gregory C. Keating 
wrote regarding accident law alone, which is that: 
[tort law] curbs the freedom of prospective injurers and enhances 
the security of potential victims. Risk impositions thus pit the 
liberty of injurers against the security of victims and the law of 
accidents sets the terms on which these competing freedoms are 
reconciled. Its task is to find and fix terms that are 
What is the goal of the review contained in this article? It cannot be to 
amuse ourselves with examples of how more efficient, transparent, 
humanitarian, or behaviorally expert we have become as we compare 
modem Western law to its ancient counterparts around the globe. To begin, 
no responsible legal anthropologist, or for that matter no sociologist, should 
examine an incident of how another culture responded to a social need and 
do so only after removing the subject from its context, taking it, in a sense, 
by forceps and removing it from its carefully constructed diorama. All of us 
have mused at one point or another as to how incomprehensible certain 
things or affairs of our modem lives would appear to visitors--of this world 
or another-who might a thousand years from now encounter such things as 
stranded, noncontextual relics. As is true today was true also in ancient 
times: very few legal rules have no social bona fides; very few rules are per 
se meritless. 
Further, our legal exploration cannot be to congratulate ourselves that 
modem Western civil code and common-law legal systems have seemingly 
213. Id. 
214. H. G. WELLS, THE OUTLINE OF HISTORY 536-37 n.1 (3d ed., Garden City Publishing 
Co. 1929) (1920). 
215. Gregory C .  Keating, A Social Contract Conception of The Tort Law of Accidents, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). 
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achieved consistent levels of efficient and moral norms. For example, for 
every arguably progressive initiative one state of this nation may take, such 
as the implementation of social host liability for permitting an inebriated 
guest to say good evening and drive away, there is a setback, such as the 
decisions of courts to disallow public nuisance claims to be brought against 
the manufacturers of small concealable handguns that by their marketing 
drown counties surrounding large metropolitan areas with these weapons 
well knowing that the guns will end up on the city streets. 
The objective of this review is to unveil and to examine how other 
cultures in distant times responded to a social imperative that has been 
constant for all of man's days: How may social groups, large and small, 
respond to the need to cabin individual behavior to advance common well- 
being? What mechanisms work best to deter behavior that saps the well- 
being of the larger group, and what inducements are most likely to increase 
the incidence of behavior that conduces to the public good? 
What has this inquiry revealed? What are the identifiable consistencies 
between the discrete but representative cultures referenced? First and 
foremost, it is shown that a standard of egalitarianism and equal application 
of law typically characterizes primitive groups deriving sustenance from 
hunting or Beyond this, perhaps the greatest consistency 
between and among the legal norms and rules discussed is that of 
proscriptions of unconsented-to taking. Whether the delict involved 
deprivation of another's right to their own reputation or the theft of goods, 
no human group, even in the earliest time, permitted one individual to take 
from another simply because he was stronger, crueler, faster or less 
principled, i.e., simply because he could otherwise get away with it. The 
collective was better served by deterring such behavior with such remedies 
as requiring the return of what was owed, be it the return of the object or its 
equivalent, or its money equivalent, or, in the case of a dignitary harm, the 
rendering of an apology or its symbolic equal, or alternatively suffering the 
penalty that would accompany the false allegation had it been true. 
A similar congruence can be seen in the treatments of trespass to land or 
private nuisance. If the harm to the property, or the interruption of the 
occupant's right to profitably exploit it, could be quantified in lost crops or 
otherwise, the amends would be in kind. Otherwise the injured party could 
be made whole by money damages. In turn, under the law of public 
nuisance, which in all times has been described as behavior that detracted 
from good of the general community, a culprit might first receive a sound 
thrashing, in the hope that it would deter continued deleterious behavior. 
2 16. ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW, supra note 50, at 25 1.  
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Lastly, it is seen that the remedies available under numerous law systems 
were quite sophisticated in the rectificatory quality of permissible awards, 
and included not only compensation in rough equivalence to the immediate 
severity of the harm suffered, but also, when appropriate, costs of care and 
rehabilitation, as well as lost income. 
Certain progressive or humanitarian progress is also evident. At the most 
ancient end of the cultural timeline investigated, the penalty for delicts 
ranging from manslaughter to battery to kidnapping might be corporal 
punishment or even death. Or the transgression might result in vendetta, or 
in a blood oath, binding the parties and their families to a violent 
continuation of the dispute. With the passage of time, though, there were 
introduced alternative means of remedying such wrongs, to wit, the 
payment of money to the victim or to his or her family--developments that 
brought the rectificatory norms into greater alignment with modern 
standards of corrective justice. 
While this article has provided a sometimes diverting romp in the fact 
and the lore of ancient normative treatment of civil wrongs, it is also a 
prkcis to a longer inquiry into the wheres, the whens, and the whos of the 
origins of our modem tort law. It can been seen that the carbon dating of the 
roots of modem common law reach back further than the rise of a lawyer 
class in pre-empire England, and with regard to the modem civil code 
treatments for extra-contractual harm, antedate even the Roman law that 
underlay the Napoleonic Code. 
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